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A few days ago a very thought provoking article written by Prof. J. H. H. Weiler
was published on ICONnect blog. I very much agree with the core of his argument
that we need to pay more attention to the popular support enjoyed by the Orbán
government and we cannot blame everything and anything on him alone. However,
there are several points in his argumentation which I would like to address.
The myth of Orbán’s widespread popular support
Prof. Weiler repeats several times that the Orbán government was voted into power
and has been reelected twice by a significant majority of the Hungarian people. If
we look at the voter turnout of the previous general elections we can see that 64,2%
of the electorate (46,6% in the second round) went to the ballot boxes in 2010,
this figure dropped to 61,2 % in 2014 and four years later it went up to 69,5% (the
second round was abolished after 2010, making it more difficult for the opposition
parties to join forces). 
More important is the gap between the results of the popular vote and the number
of parliamentary seats won by Fidesz. The support of 52,73% of those who cast a
vote was enough to yield a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly in 2010.
The 2014 elections showed that a rigged electoral system can secure a qualified
parliamentary majority for the governing parties with only 44,87% of the popular vote
in their pocket. And in 2018 Orbán’s party yet again returned to power with two-thirds
of the mandates despite that fact that just 49,27% of the voters supported Fidesz.
So, in sheer numbers the 2018 elections looked like this: 8 312 264 Hungarians had
the franchise, 5 732 283 people cast a valid vote and 2 824 551 voters supported
Fidesz (49,24% of the popular vote and 33,9% of the whole electorate). It is true that
due to their electoral system the governments of well-functioning democracies do
not necessarily enjoy a stronger popular support either. But my point is that looking
exclusively at the number of seats in the parliament does not tell the full story about
the popular support of the Orbán regime.
The expression of the popular will
Prof. Weiler argues that the Hungarian parliament „is a more or less accurate
and true reflection of the popular will” and he makes a very brief reference to the
fact that the “the information and deliberative processes have been perverted”.
Let me elaborate on that a little bit. Since 2011, Orbán’s governing majority has
systematically re-regulated every single aspect of the electoral system to create
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a tilted electoral playing field. The numerous changes can be summarized in the
following trends: (i) enhancing the majoritarian character of the system, (ii) favoring
the stronger parties at the expense of the smaller ones (including a weird system
of ‘winner compensation’, (iii) dividing the opposition by legislative measures and
making their cooperation more difficult, (iv) guaranteeing the dominance of the
governing majority in the media, (v) ensuring the political loyalty of the electoral
supervisory organs and (vi) making the effective enforcement of the electoral rules
complicated.
In addition, the electoral game is played in a media environment which is far from
being free. The 2018 ODIHR report summarized very well the campaign tactics
employed by the governing coalition such as the exclusion of paid political ads
from public TV channels, the biased coverage of candidates in the public media,
the lack of distinction between government communication and the campaign of
the governing parties (as candidate organizations), the shrinking possibilities for
opposition parties to reach out to the voters and so on. The report shows very clearly
that the 2018 elections were free but not fair. 
Just a few weeks ago, Hungary’s largest online news portal, Index, was brought to
its knees. (N.B. in 2016 Hungary’s largest opposition newspaper, Népszabadság,
was forced to close down as well.) Everybody suspects government oligarchs
behind the scenes. And the efforts to completely undermine media freedom do not
face any serious challenges. For example, the Hungarian Constitutional Court has
recently concluded that the Executive’s decision declaring the acquisition of certain
media companies by the government controlled Central European Press and Media
Foundation a matter of national strategic importance was perfectly compatible with
the constitution.
Long story short, the Hungarian Parliament is not an accurate and true reflection
of the popular will. I completely agree with Prof. Weiler that we should not fall into
the trap of “deresponsiblizing” the People, the nation, the electorate. But we should
equally reject the assumption that in Hungary, where the electoral system is rigged,
and the media is only partly free, the Fidesz government expresses the will of the
vast majority of the electorate. The “consent” of the God-given people is still the most
powerful legitimizing force, so Orbán uses seemingly democratic elections to cement
his power but not to allow people to express their free will.
Arbitrariness vs cruelty
Prof. Weiler warns us not to call Orbán a dictator because he is nothing like
Franco, Pol Pot or Ceau#escu. The Orbán regime is definitely not as cruel as the
dictatorships of the 20th century were. But it is primarily because he does not need
the classic toolkit of dictatorial rule to stay in power and execute his will. Much more
subtle legislative measures, administrative tricks and political tactics can yield very
similar results.
The opposite of the Rule of Law is arbitrariness, not cruelty. Cruelty is only the most
visible sign of arbitrariness. The essential characteristic of the Orbán regime is the
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arbitrary exercise of power. If we enjoy a certain degree of freedom in this country,
it is not because the political power is limited or controlled, but only because Orbán
still shows some mercy. But make no mistake. Scholars are regularly targeted by
government mouthpieces, the Academy of Sciences has recently been stripped of
its research centers, universities are chased away from the country or deprived of
their autonomy, administrative proceedings are launched against opposition parties,
independent news portals can be dismantled from one day to the next, and so on.
And these are just a few examples from the last couple of months having nothing to
do with the extraordinary powers obtained by the government during the pandemic.
Blaming the people
I fully support Prof. Weiler’s idea of paying more attention to the will of the people,
focusing more on the channels of democratic will-formation and breathing new life
into the honorable traditions of republican democracy. However, I would like to
address several (explicit and implicit) points of Prof. Weiler’s argumentation leading
up to his conclusion.
Firstly, we need to make a clear difference between the observation that the Orbán
government has sufficient electoral support to stay in power and the argument that
the people are responsible for keeping him and his party in office. The first is a
simple statement of fact which is undeniable – although the rigged electoral system
should not be forgotten –, but the second is a value judgment which, I think, can be
problematic for several reasons.
Firstly, ever since the fall of the socialist dictatorship in Hungary the political,
economic, and cultural elite has monopolized the political decision-making. Apart
from a few rather symbolic gestures (typically in the form of a referendum), the
Hungarian citizens have been relegated to the simple role of voting machines called
to the ballot boxes every four years. Citizens have always had very limited access
to the institutionalized channels of democratic will-formation. How can we hold the
very same people who have been constantly excluded from the political sphere
responsible for not exercising their democratic rights more actively and responsibly?
Secondly, I do not think it is fair to have high expectations of the people, especially if
the country’s elite is unwilling to set a good example. Yes, there are intellectuals and
public figures who criticize the government very harshly. But the political, economic,
and cultural elite has so far failed to produce any form of coordinated, effective
resistance to the Orbán regime that people could join or support. It is not by chance
that András Jakab wrote an article a few weaks ago about the moral dilemmas
of teaching constitutional law in an autocratizing country (Hungary.) Even some
lawyers – well educated people of the upper class – are afraid to speak up or simply
chose to ignore the problems. Why do we expect ordinary people living in much less
privileged circumstances to win those battles that the elite is simply too lazy to fight?
Thirdly, in a multiparty democracy it is primarily the responsibility of the political
parties to offer the electorate a viable political program and convince the people that
they are ready and able to govern. Opposition parties achieved significant success at
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the 2019 local elections. Hope was in the air because it seemed to be the beginning
of a long chain of positive changes. But it turned out to be a delusion. The opposition
parties have not gained much strength and their cooperation has not become more
coordinated.
People cannot oust the Fidesz government from power without voting a new political
party (or coalition) into office at the same time. Not to mention that many significant
reforms would require a qualified parliamentary majority. We cannot hold the
people responsible for the failure of the opposition parties to do their homework.
Empirical research indicates that the majority of the Hungarian population is actually
receptible to social-democratic values, the evaluation of the Orbán government’s
performance is not so positive and euroscepticism is not widespread. So, it would
not be impossible for a strong coalition of the opposition parties to win the elections
(despite every legal and administrative hurdle). But expecting the vast majority of the
electors to rebel against the Orbán regime for such abstract values as separation of
powers and the rule of law would be a clear sign of naivety.
Finally, let me mention a rather practical reason why blaming the people can be a
dangerous strategy. Every time the Hungarian government is criticized by foreign
and international stakeholders, Orbán pretends that it is the nation which is under
attack. In addition, scholars and NGOs are already labelled as „foreign agents” and
„Soros mercenaries” conspiring against the country. In these circumstances one has
to choose her words very carefully.
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